


YouTube malware analysis

Analysis description:

This report is an analysis of malware found on the YouTube platform. It focuses on a specific case in which a download link from the description of a video was used, advertising crack software for the popular Acrobat Reader application. After downloading and analyzing the contents of the .rar file, it was found to contain malware focused on stealing information from the victim's device.




The report also includes information about the localized IP addresses to which the malware was connecting. Subsequent .exe files that were downloaded and contacted the same IP addresses are analyzed. The analyses showed the presence of the same types of malware, with a few additional types discovered during the investigation.


The report highlights that all the malicious files examined communicated with two common IP addresses. In addition, using ETag analysis, it was possible to locate further IP addresses that could be used for the same purpose.

The document describes the process of identifying and analyzing the malware, demonstrating the steps that were taken to identify and understand the operation of the malware, as well as its communication points in the form of IP addresses.


- 1) Searching for malware on the Youtube platform under the key phrase: "password 1234 crack":




- 2) Downloading links from descriptions and selecting one for analysis:




- 3) **Link to download crack software for popular application: Acrobat Reader** (Youtube video published on 23.07.2023):





- 4) **Download the .rar file from the link from the video description:**



- 5) **Entering the password from the description of the video into the archive and unpacking the contents:**



- 6) **Contents of .rar archive. Size after extracting: 78.8 MB.** A procedure specifically used (artificially increasing file size) by criminals to make malware analysis more difficult:



- 7) **Uploading the .rar file for analysis at Tria.ge** (full report: <https://tria.ge/230726-l1lxjsag48/behavioral2>):

General

Target
Setup.exe

Size
1MB

MD5
b1a9be4cfd7cc474f6025d7e4905f72e

SHA1
5a6b703d1939386d33f3e146388ed361b4004508

SHA256
2e449f3f958bc7e68b7a18f6d9a62703d48646d315b3bc3751a979285468e30e

SHA512
8026521366eab3263b8d791795773996ce3aa81c74d5c1bed5a5cde83f50ff2047d38017e82349fad738e44c7bd367aae13058213a97dd145ad53468b091d3cd

SSDEEP
24576:XiZpsW8YWGeocqGTRn8PpFo0jyV5Cr9paVmGuJnSJgHX3lVlm:XykGhIPpF2KRpaKS2Hn+m

Score
10 /10

AMADEY LUMMA
SECTOPRAT DISCOVERY
EVASION PERSISTENCE
RAT SPYWARE
STEALER THEMIDA
TROJAN

8) The analysis showed that the .exe file contained malware, toiling to steal information from the victim's device, such as:

- AMADEY
- Stealer LUMMA
- SECTOPRAT

Amadey
Amadey bot is a simple trojan bot primarily used for collecting reconnaissance information.

AMADEY TROJAN









Lumma Stealer
An infostealer written in C++ first seen in August 2022.

LUMMA STEALER

SectopRAT
SectopRAT is a remote access trojan first seen in November 2019.

SECTOPRAT TROJAN RAT


9) In the next step of the analysis, we checked which addresses the malware connects to when it tries to run:

	45.9.74.166:80	http://45.9.74.166/b7dJSDcPcZ/index.php	http	bstyoops.exe ▾
	45.9.74.141:80	http://45.9.74.141/b7dJSDcPcZ/index.php	http	bstyoops.exe ▾
	172.67.218.106:80	http://dhanwantaridiagnostics.com/BRR.exe	http	bstyoops.exe ▾
	172.67.218.106:80	http://dhanwantaridiagnostics.com/BRR.exe	http	bstyoops.exe ▾
	139.99.165.151:80	http://sdgstudio.com.au/s64com.dll	http	bstyoops.exe ▾
	139.99.165.151:80	http://sdgstudio.com.au/s64com.dll	http	bstyoops.exe ▾
	95.143.190.57:15647			BRR.exe ▾
	95.143.190.57:15647			BRR.exe ▾

C2:


45.9.74.166:80
45.9.74.141:80
172.67.218.106:80
139.99.165.151:80
95.143.190.57:15647

a) 45.9.74[.]166
Fofa.info:




Details of the server's IP address, from which we can find out the value of Etag:
"64a7fa74-264"

Etag analysis:



Checking the Etag value in the Shodan.io tool, from where we can learn about two more IP addresses (the .141 address was already known during the tria.ge malware analysis):

- 45.9.74.141 (<https://www.virustotal.com/gui/ip-address/45.9.74.141>);
- 45.9.74.95 (<https://www.virustotal.com/gui/ip-address/45.9.74.95>);
- 45.9.74.164 (<https://www.virustotal.com/gui/ip-address/45.9.74.164>);



10) Downloading another .exe file from the address with which, the malware contacted:

173.254.192.99:443 https://www.academyoffinearts.in/a3e34cg.exe tls, http RegSvc.exe ^

87.6KB ↑ 5.0MB ↓ 1879 📄 3606 📄

HTTP Request
GET https://www.academyoffinearts.in/a3e34cg.exe

HTTP Response
200

11) Analysis of file: a3e34cg.exe in Tria.ge
(full report: <https://tria.ge/230726-m6pfasba29/behavioral1>):

General

Target
a3e34cg.exe

Size
4MB

MD5
341e2e0fbcc88e262ed896ee11c06532

SHA1
60cd85254f5faeb3ba526650daf85b773b458b90

SHA256
250b10e7a4025f8845c9287d86eb1101f18f23e2dd3c50df642cbc40756afa97

SHA512
ea70d5bc2dc264ec92c57edaef2fe343e48c7f6d12d5b5c71432807fe19c536b10139b00040b364c15fc940d1ac9cf0e42f18e6dee1c412acdea17ac9e30d850

SSDEEP
49152:rOjkgSYGuvkNaJ/b0GYmsmf/sAa8hdCQB2xrajUVNY36pMK6CrOlVYApvSzZQljF:rXuvPZwAcQBVjUzgiMC02Xv+E

Score
10/10

- AMADEY
- SECTOPRAT
- DISCOVERY
- EVASION
- PERSISTENCE
- RAT
- SPYWARE
- STEALER
- THEMIDA
- TROJAN

12) Analysis showed that the a3e34cg.exe file contained malware similar to the previous sample.

This time there is no - Lumma Stealer:

- AMADEY
- SECTOPRAT

Amadey
Amadey bot is a simple trojan bot primarily used for collecting reconnaissance information.

- AMADEY
- TROJAN

SectopRAT
SectopRAT is a remote access trojan first seen in November 2019.

- SECTOPRAT
- TROJAN
- RAT

SectopRAT payload • 1 IoCs

13) Just like when we analyzed the first sample, we will check which IPs the malware is connecting to:

	45.9.74.166:80	http://45.9.74.166/b7djSDcPcZ/index.php	http	bstyoops.exe ▾
	45.9.74.141:80	http://45.9.74.141/b7djSDcPcZ/index.php	http	bstyoops.exe ▾
	104.21.59.74:80	http://dhanwantaridiagnostics.com/BRR.exe	http	bstyoops.exe ▾
	104.21.59.74:80	http://dhanwantaridiagnostics.com/BRR.exe	http	bstyoops.exe ▾
	139.99.165.151:80	http://sdgstudio.com.au/s64com.dll	http	bstyoops.exe ▾
	139.99.165.151:80	http://sdgstudio.com.au/s64com.dll	http	bstyoops.exe ▾
	95.143.190.57:15647			BRR.exe ▾
	95.143.190.57:15647			BRR.exe ▾
	5.42.65.67:4298			rundll32.exe ▾
	5.42.65.67:4298			rundll32.exe ▾

C2:

45.9.74.166:80
45.9.74.141:80
104.21.59.74:80
139.99.165.151:80
95.143.190.57:15647
5.42.65.67:4298 - NEW ADDRESS

14) In the next step, we took another sample from:

hxxp://sdgstudio.com[.]au/s64com.dll and we submitted it for analysis at Tria.ge (full report: <https://tria.ge/230726-nhbd7sba78/behavioral1>)

General

Target
s64com.dll

Size
6MB

MD5
cb44d16ebac295a75245dce05a75997b

SHA1
101cc9e8df36e1e7061f449a84109d1d75e6f8ae

SHA256
313e88911d2fc41f7b03e1d35e101b4a9401a11e51abc818a35697c36f86f355

SHA512
a21a09fe60dd4380fdb9fbbee0e6f0c543a8182aa6b3be5e77306928222c90bdd27b6dc2a1f54f31a5ba3c0322914a36c009773f30f9b94c4246110254bbb4b

SSDEEP
196608:r/Ux5R45q2JoGqtQLHTE/+667kFiQwI99:AI5q2yXtaU+6U7I

Score

10 ^{/10}

SYSTEMBC

TROJAN

15) Analysis showed that the s64com.dll file had malware - SystemBC - sewn into it.

IP address: 5.42.65[.]67:4298 was already learned by us during the analysis of the previous sample: a3e34cg.exe (<https://www.virustotal.com/gui/ip-address/5.42.65.67/relations>).

Malware Config
^

Extracted

Family	systembc
C2	5.42.65.67:4298
	localhost.exchange:4298

Copy all

16) Another sample that was analyzed and comes from the same campaign is the file: BRR.exe, hosted at: hxxp://dhanwantaridiagnostics[.]com/BRR.exe

104.21.59.74:80
http://dhanwantaridiagnostics.com/BRR.exe
http
bstyoops.exe ^

20.6KB
1.1MB
446
832


HTTP Request

GET http://dhanwantaridiagnostics.com/BRR.exe

HTTP Response


200

The site: hxxp://dhanwantaridiagnostics[.]com was used by criminals as C2 to host malware. The appearance of the listed site:



17) Analysis of theBRR.exe file in Tria.ge

(full report: <https://tria.ge/230726-nx5xcsbb65/behavioral1>):



General

Target
BRR.exe

Size
1MB

MD5
013a5e128ecd7d261ebb0cd57f659990

SHA1
9aed3eca1616d73cc757057e999ba5e2be40a0cd

SHA256
85a441a8192d90196dc71aea38dd40f892d94f9868f082f3f7b
b6957782bd61f

SHA512
db5c695a886d9e28154fc998f9cce3eb7d363a7adf40ae4d02
3b4702c16ab8556d96044bdf51c1d0772319b1d1503d3b6fd5
5f6d38cd9588058ad30a34dad36a

SSDEEP
49152:0syFA+tlwq7fizTcsqkZieGBrX7halmF+gSl:5OxEfissqFZ
BrX7hJmF+t

Score
10^{/10}

SECTOPRAT
DISCOVERY
EVASION
RAT
SPYWARE
STEALER
THEMIDA
TROJAN

18) The analysis showed that the BRR.EXE file had malware - SECTOPRAT - sewn into it.

The IP address to which the aforementioned sample connects is 95.143.190.57:15647 was already learned by us during the analysis of the source sample: Setup.exe (<https://www.virustotal.com/gui/ip-address/95.143.190.57>).

Summary

This malware analysis report provides detailed information on cybercriminal activity carried out on the YouTube platform. In particular, it focuses on the malware distribution method of including download links in video descriptions.

The investigation involved downloading and analyzing files that were found to contain various types of malware, including some that focus on stealing information from the victim's device.


Etag analysis was able to identify more IP addresses that could be used for the same purpose. Each of the malicious files communicated with two common IP addresses.

These are the addresses:

`hxxp://45.9.74[.]141/b7djSDcPcZ/index.php`

`hxxp://45.9.74[.]166/b7djSDcPcZ/index.php`



At the above addresses, we can find the AmadeyBot login panel:



[TLP:CLEAR]

Analysis and a search by ETag values found more addresses:

- 45.9.74[.]95/b7djSDcPcZ/Login.php
(<https://www.virustotal.com/gui/ip-address/45.9.74.95>);
- 45.9.74[.]164/ b7djSDcPcZ/Login.php
(<https://www.virustotal.com/gui/ip-address/45.9.74.164>);
- http://45.9.74[.]119/b7djSDcPcZ/Login.php
(<https://www.virustotal.com/gui/ip-address/45.9.74.119>);



Shodan query:

"64a7fa74-264"

Fuzzing results of the above addresses:

- hxxp://45.9.74[.]164/files.rar
- hxxp://45.9.74[.]141/files.rar
- hxxp://45.9.74[.]119/files.rar